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knowledge, communication between the players is subject to divergent
interpretation of the sender’s messages by the receiver, and divergent
prediction of the receiver’s reaction by the sender. We show that the
complementary nature of these phenomena can result in significant
welfare consequences even with a “small” (in a certain sense) departure
from (exact) common knowledge.
1 Introduction
In real-life communication, mutual miscommunication due to divergent in-
terpretation of messages and divergent prediction of reactions to messages
(and their interactions) are often observed. For example, consider the po-
tential employer of a job market candidate who has a recommendation letter
saying that he is “very good”. The interpretation of this message is based
on the employer’s subjective belief about the recommender’s characteristics.
If the potential employer believes that the recommender is sincere, then this
candidate may be hired; otherwise, the employer may discount the recom-
mendation and may not hire him. In this sense, different employers may
interpret the same message differently. We call this phenomenon divergent
interpretation.
Likewise, different recommenders may have different subjective beliefs
about the employer’s reaction to their messages. We call this phenomenon
divergent prediction. How to recommend a potential employee is based on
2
the recommender’s belief about the employer’s interpretation, which can be
a source of exaggeration of the recommendation. For example, if the sin-
cere recommender thinks that the employer interprets his message at face
value, then he may genuinely say “very good”. However, if the recommender
believes that the employer may discount his message, then he may say “ex-
tremely good” instead of saying “very good”, hoping that, after the message
is discounted, the employer essentially interprets it (and takes an action) in
the way the recommender intends.
Importantly, such an exaggeration of messages owing to divergent pre-
diction may exacerbate the divergent interpretation by further blurring the
link between the face values of messages and their intended meaning. In this
sense, divergent interpretation and divergent prediction are complementary,
and because of this complementarity, these phenomena may have a significant
effect on the nature of information that is communicated between players.
These phenomena can be observed, not only in the recommendation context,
but also in many other contexts, such as advertisements, political campaigns,
and so on.
The main objective of this paper is to clarify welfare consequences of
miscommunication due to the complementarity of divergent interpretation
and divergent prediction, in an environment where the game’s payoff struc-
ture is only approximately common knowledge. To reach our objective, we
consider a situation in which some parameters are not commonly known.
Particularly, in the following sense, the relaxation of the common knowledge
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assumptions in the standard framework is necessary in order to appropri-
ately understand these phenomena and their complementary natures. First,
in the standard model, where the payoff structure is common knowledge, in
any fixed equilibrium, the intended meaning of each message is interpreted
by the receiver exactly the way in which the sender intends (and this feature
is common knowledge). In this sense, there is no divergent interpretation.
Second, because of the first point, there is also no possibility of divergent pre-
diction. As a consequence, the potential welfare effects of these phenomena
are underestimated.1
In the approximate common knowledge scenario studied in this paper,
it is common knowledge that the bias parameter is in [−ε, ε], but that the
players do not necessarily agree on the exact value of the bias parameter. In
this sense, whenever ε > 0, the players’ beliefs about the “true model” are
not perfectly aligned, as opposed to the standard common-knowledge setting.
Thus, even in an equilibrium, different “types” of the receiver may interpret
each message differently. Likewise, different “types” of the sender may pre-
dict the receiver’s reaction to each message differently. Therefore, even if ε
is close to zero so that the model is almost common knowledge, divergent
interpretation and divergent prediction (and their interactions) may occur.
We show that these phenomena could significantly distort communication.
As a base model, consider a standard cheap-talk model where the preferences
of the sender and the receiver are perfectly aligned (i.e., there is no “bias”).
1This claim is formalized in Section 4.
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In this case, it may be reasonable to imagine that the players play a fully
revealing equilibrium, which is most informative and optimal in terms of the
players’ welfare if the model is common knowledge. However, if the model
is only imperfectly common knowledge, then the players would be subject
to divergent interpretation and divergent prediction, which may significantly
confuse information transmission in this equilibrium. More precisely, for any
ε > 0, there is a Harsanyi type space that satisfies the following. First, it
is common knowledge that the bias is in [−ε, ε] in this type space. Second,
for any equilibrium such that “full revelation occurs whenever zero bias is
commonly believed”, any message may be sent in any state by some type
of sender, and therefore, any action may be played in any state by some
type of receiver. We observe that this equilibrium exhibits both divergent
interpretation and divergent prediction (to be defined later), and their com-
plementarity results in maximal miscommunication in the sense that the set
of possible equilibrium actions is always unbounded, which is the main result
of this paper.2
We also show that if an equilibrium does not exhibit divergent interpreta-
tion or divergent prediction (i.e., at least one of them), then the set of possible
2In Theorem 1, this result is obtained by a type space without common prior about the
bias parameter. One may wonder if the same result would be obtained with a type space
that is consistent with some common prior, which would be particularly relevant if one is
interested in the “ex ante” welfare effects of such miscommunication. Although weaker in
a formal sense, we obtain a similar result (Proposition 1) of maximal miscommunication
under additional structures of the model, which suggests that absence of a common prior
itself is not the crucial source of this phenomenon, but rather relaxation of the common
knowledge of the bias parameter is.
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equilibrium actions is never unbounded, and furthermore, under reasonable
technical assumptions, it is small (in a certain probabilistic sense formally de-
fined later). Thus, the combination of divergent interpretation and divergent
prediction is necessary for significant effects of miscommunication.
1.1 Related literature
Our notion of divergent interpretation and divergent prediction is closely re-
lated to the concept of language barriers. Blume and Board (2013) consider a
common-interest cheap-talk game with language types of the players, which
determine the set of messages that the players can send and understand.
They show that, because each player only knows his/her own language type,
equilibria exhibit indeterminacy of indicative (resp. imperative) meaning,
which indicates that the receiver’s (resp. sender’s) equilibrium behavior may
not be ex post optimal due to uncertainty about language types. Giovan-
noni and Xiong (2017) and Blume (2018) investigate welfare consequences of
language barriers, and point out that language barriers are not impediments
to efficient communication if the message space is sufficiently rich (in some
sense). More specifically, the former considers an environment a` la Crawford
and Sobel (1982) in which both players’ language types matter. The latter
considers the sender’s language type in common-interest games, but where
its higher-order uncertainty is relevant.3
3In a broad sense, noisy-talk games (Blume, Board, and Kawamura, 2007; Blume and
Board, 2014; Lightle, 2014) also represent misspecification of the opponent’s behaviors
because the receiver may not correctly recognize the sent message due to noise structures.
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This paper can be regarded as a complement of these studies. As in the
previous works introducing language types as additional uncertainty, we add
uncertainty about the bias, which might prevent efficient communication,
and study its impacts. In particular, our two distortion properties (divergent
interpretation/prediction) imply negative welfare impacts as by the indeter-
minacy of indicative/imperative meaning of Blume and Board (2013).4 In
contrast, our scope is quite different from theirs. The objective of our paper
is to investigate the interactions of the two distortion properties, which is
not well discussed in the literature. In fact, the existing works study those
properties separately or focus on the environment where they are negligible.
Furthermore, our welfare implications about the additional uncertainty is
opposite to those in the literature. Specifically, Blume (2018) shows that if
uncertainty about the language type is sufficiently small (in some sense), then
its impact is negligible (Proposition 3). However, we show that even though
the additional uncertainty is sufficiently small, its impact to the welfare is
significant.
The impact of uncertain bias in cheap-talk games is also studied in the lit-
erature. For example, Morgan and Stocken (2003), Dimitrakas and Sarafidis
(2006), Li and Madara´sz (2008), and Gordon (2010, 2011) analyze environ-
ments where the bias parameter is the sender’s private information.5 How-
4Divergent interpretation/prediction is defined as disagreement of beliefs about the op-
ponent’s behavior. In contrast, indeterminacy of indicative/imperative meaning is defined
as deviations from the ex post optimality (due to uncertainty about language types), which
does not necessitate disagreed beliefs. As a consequence, we have different implications
about these properties, which is discussed later.
5These papers study one-shot communication where the sender’s preference is state
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ever, these papers assume that the bias parameter follows a specific distri-
bution which itself is common knowledge, and in this sense, these papers
only consider “low-order” uncertainty. As a result, the complementarity of
divergent interpretation and divergent prediction does not arise in those envi-
ronments, while this complementarity is the main driving force of our welfare
implication.6
We follow the literature on robust prediction in games with respect to
players’ high-order beliefs, such as Monderer and Samet (1989), Kajii and
Morris (1997), and Morris and Ui (2005), to model approximate common
knowledge. These papers perturb players’ beliefs such that the base model
is common p-belief with p close to (but not) one (“approximate common
knowledge”).7 More precisely, we follow its generalized version by Oury and
Tercieux (2007), allowing for a small misspecification of the model, possi-
bly with a high probability.8 These studies investigate whether or not the
predicted behavior in the base model is “robust” in the sense that a simi-
dependent. See also Sobel (1985), Benabou and Laroque (1992) and Morris (2001) who
study the impact of uncertain bias in repeated interactions, and Diehl and Kuzmics (2014)
for the model in which the sender’s preference is state independent.
6Pei (2015) is close to our setting in that he studies the impact of higher-order un-
certainty on the bias parameter. However, in his setting, the bias parameter can take
either 0 or +∞, which differs from our setting where it is close to zero. Furthermore, the
complementarity between divergent interpretation and divergent prediction is beyond the
scope of his paper.
7The main differences to those papers are as follows. First, we do not necessarily
assume a common prior in modeling the players’ perturbed beliefs, while most of the
papers in the literature consider common-prior type spaces; and second, we only consider
“parametrized” uncertainty (more specifically, only uncertainty about the sender’s bias
parameter), while other papers usually consider non-parametric uncertainty.
8Similar notions of perturbation appear also in Chassang and Takahashi (2011) and
Meyer-ter-Vehn and Morris (2011).
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lar behavior is an equilibrium even if the model is not common knowledge,
but is almost common knowledge in the above sense. For various classes of
finite games, they provide conditions for such robustness. Our focus is on
an important class of continuous games, specifically cheap-talk games a` la
Crawford and Sobel (1982), and we show that equilibrium prediction with
approximate common knowledge (of the bias parameter) can be very different
from the one with (full) common knowledge.9
In the literature, another, but a distinct, popular approach to model
“nearby” common-knowledge situations exhibits k-th order mutual belief for
arbitrary finite (though not infinite) k, such as Rubinstein (1989), Carlsson
and van Damme (1993), Weinstein and Yildiz (2007), and so on.10 Estab-
lishing formal relationships among those different approaches in the current
context would be an interesting future direction, but it should be noted that,
in a general class of games, these versions of nearby common knowledge
perturbation is typically strictly more permissive than the “approximate”
common knowledge approaches discussed in the last paragraph (which our
approach is closer to). For example, in Weinstein and Yildiz (2007), no
(nontrivial) event is common knowledge, because at some level k (finite, how
large it is), a player’s type is arbitrarily different from the baseline payoff
type, which is crucial to obtain their result that any rationalizable action
9Lu (2017) studies the robustness of a fully-revealing equilibrium in the context of
multiple-sender models, and obtains a negative implication for its validity.
10Chen, Takahashi, and Xiong (2014) study this approach with arbitrary payoff uncer-
tainty, and show that a Cournot oligipoly with three or more firms admits a large set of
quantity choices each as uniquely rationalizable outcomes.
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of the player can be his unique equilibrium action in a perturbed (in their
sense) model. In contrast, our “approximate” common knowledge approach
considers a less permissive perturbation (and in this sense “closer” to the
exact common knowledge situation) in that the nontrivial event that the
payoff parameter is close to the baseline case is indeed common knowledge.
Hence, in principle, the set of equilibrium actions in our case can be much
smaller than that of all rationalizable actions predicted by Weinstein and
Yildiz (2007).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model where
the players face high-order uncertainty on the bias parameter. Section 3
demonstrates that the maximal miscommunication could occur in this envi-
ronment, and Section 4 clarifies that it is a consequence of the complementary
nature of divergent interpretation and divergent prediction. Section 5 con-
cludes the paper. All proofs appear in Appendix A, and an extension beyond
the quadratic-loss preferences is discussed in Appendix B.
2 Model
Consider a cheap-talk model a` la Crawford and Sobel (1982) with quadratic-
loss utilities. There are two players, a sender (i = 1) and a receiver (i = 2).11
The sender knows the true payoff-state, θ ∈ Θ, while the receiver does not.
We consider a message game where the sender sends a message m ∈ M in
11As a convention, we treat the sender as male and the receiver as female throughout
this paper.
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the first stage, and then the receiver takes an action a ∈ A in the second
stage after observing m. In the following, we assume Θ = A = M = R to
simplify the argument.12 The sender’s utility is u(a, θ, d) = −(a − θ − d)2,
and the receiver’s utility is v(a, θ) = −(a − θ)2, where d ∈ R represents the
difference in their preferences, called the bias parameter.
In the standard model, we assume that d is common knowledge, and θ
follows a specific common-knowledge distribution. Instead, we assume that
the model is only approximately common knowledge. Specifically, we only
assume that it is common knowledge between the players that “d is close
to zero”, that is, there exists ε > 0 such that it is common knowledge that
|d| ≤ ε. Let D = [−ε, ε]. This assumption may be reasonable in a setting
where it is common knowledge that each player has a statistically consistent
estimator (perhaps based on data) for the bias parameter. As a result of
consistency, each players’ estimate is close to the true value (with a high
probability), and this itself is common knowledge. Nevertheless, it is not
necessarily the case that those estimates coincide.
Even with these assumptions, the players’ beliefs, represented by a Harsanyi
type space denoted by T = (T1, T2, b1, b2), could have a rich structure. Specif-
ically, for each i = 1, 2, player i’s type is an element ti of a measurable space
Ti. His belief mapping is a measurable mapping bi : Ti → ∆(T−i), that
is, given his type ti, his belief over T−i is represented by bi(ti) ∈ ∆(T−i).
12A similar (though slightly weaker) result holds in a more standard case with bounded
Θ and A with appropriate modifications, available from the authors upon request.
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Because the sender knows the bias parameter d and the true state θ, let
d(t1) ∈ D and θ(t1) ∈ Θ denote, respectively, the bias and the true state
when the sender’s type is t1. These mappings d(·) and θ(·) are assumed to
be measurable. We denote by T = T1 × T2 the set of type profiles. Given
t2 ∈ T2, the receiver’s marginal belief about d is denoted by bD2 (t2) ∈ ∆(D),
that is, for each measurable set E ⊆ D:
bD2 (E|t2) =
∫
T1
1{d(t1) ∈ E}db2(t1|t2). (1)
To represent the common knowledge assumptions introduced above, for
every t2, we assume that b
D
2 (D|t2) = 1. Let Tε represent the class of the type
spaces satisfying those conditions.
In the message game, given T , let σ1 : T1 → M denote the sender’s
pure strategy, σ2 : T2 ×M → A denote the receiver’s pure strategy,13 and
ψ : T2 ×M → ∆(Θ) be the receiver’s posterior beliefs on the payoff-state.
The solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE, hereafter) defined
as follows.
Definition 1. A triple (σ∗1, σ
∗
2, ψ
∗) is a PBE if it satisfies the following con-
ditions:
(i) for any t1 ∈ T1,
σ∗1(t1) ∈ arg max
m∈M
∫
t2∈T2
u(σ∗2(t2,m), θ(t1), d(t1))db1(t2|t1), (2)
13We focus on pure (and measurable) strategies throughout the paper.
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(ii) for any t2 ∈ T2 and m ∈M ,
σ∗2 ∈ argmax
a∈A
∫
θ∈Θ
v(a, θ)dψ∗(θ|t2,m); (3)
(iii) for any t2 ∈ T2 and m ∈ M , ψ∗(·|t2,m) is a regular conditional proba-
bility measure given σ∗1.
14
To economize notation, we simply represent equilibrium (σ∗1, σ
∗
2, ψ
∗) as
σ∗ = (σ∗1, σ
∗
2) unless it is confusing. Let A(θ|σ∗) denote the set of equilibrium
actions of the receiver when the true state is θ in equilibrium σ∗, that is:
A(θ|σ∗) = { a ∈ A | ∃(t1, t2) ∈ T s.t. θ(t1) = θ, a = σ∗2 (t2, σ∗1(t1)) } . (4)
This A(θ|σ∗) is our main object of interest for the remainder of this
paper. If A(θ|σ∗) contains an action that is far from θ, we interpret it as
a consequence of miscommunication. We study how each player’s divergent
belief about the other player, which can be arbitrarily “small”, maps to the
size of miscommunication, which is defined by supA(θ|σ∗)− inf A(θ|σ∗).15
14Θ = R guarantees that such a regular conditional probability measure exists for any t2
andm (the regular conditional probability property). As is well known, a regular conditional
probability measure may not be unique. In particular, given any “off-path” message, any
probability measure over Θ would work.
15Because we want to compare, for example, A(θ|σ′) = [θ − ε, θ + ε] and A(θ|σ′′) = A,
the definition based on its cardinality is inappropriate.
13
3 Maximal miscommunication
In the base model where d = 0 is common knowledge, it is reasonable to
imagine that a fully revealing equilibrium is played.16 To formalize the idea,
we introduce the following additional notation. Given a type space T =
(T1, T2, b1, b2) ∈ Tε, consider a subset of types T˜i ⊆ Ti for each i such that,
for each i and ti ∈ T˜i, bi(T˜−i|ti) = 1, that is, T˜ = T˜1 × T˜2 is a belief-closed
subset. If, in addition, d(t1) = 0 for every t1 ∈ T˜1, we say that zero bias is
commonly believed in T˜ .
Definition 2. A PBE σ∗ given T has Property FR0 if the following is satis-
fied: for every belief-closed subset T˜ such that zero bias is commonly believed,
every θ ∈ Θ, every t1 ∈ T˜1 such that θ(t1) = θ, and every t2 ∈ T˜2, we have
σ∗1(t1) = θ and σ
∗
2(t2, σ
∗
1(t1)) = θ.
That is, whenever d = 0 is commonly believed among the players, full
revelation of information occurs. Throughout this section, we fix an equilib-
rium with Property FR0, denoted by σ∗. It is worthwhile to remark that if
d = 0 is common knowledge (in T ), then Property FR0 immediately implies
that A(θ|σ∗) = {θ} for any θ. We are interested in the effects of slightly
relaxing the common knowledge assumption in the sense that only |d| ≤ ε
is common knowledge. In fact, its effect can be significant, as stated in the
following theorem, which is the main result of this paper.
16In other words, we focus on the maximum-partitioned equilibrium if d = 0 is common
knowledge. It is often an implicit convention in cheap-talk games to focus on the maximum-
partitioned equilibrium, based on the justification given by the “no incentive to separate”
(NITS) condition of Chen, Kartik, and Sobel (2008).
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Theorem 1. For each ε > 0, there exists T ∈ Tε such that: (i) a PBE with
Property FR0 exists; and (ii) for any PBE σ∗ with Property FR0, we have
A(θ|σ∗) = A for every θ.
Theorem 1 shows that if we slightly relax the common knowledge assump-
tion on the bias parameter and focus on a “seemingly natural” equilibrium
in which full revelation occurs for those who commonly believe d = 0, then
we must admit any action choice at any θ. In this sense, the equilibrium ex-
hibits the “maximal” level of miscommunication. Recall that, in our model,
it is common knowledge that the bias parameter lies in an arbitrarily small
interval, and in this sense, the amount of the players’ disagreement about it
is arbitrarily small. Nevertheless, this disagreement (no matter how small)
implies maximal miscommunication. As we discuss in Section 4, this is a
consequence of the complementary nature of divergent interpretation (of the
sender’s messages by different types of the receiver) and divergent prediction
(of the receiver’s reactions by different types of the sender), which we define
formally in Section 4.
3.1 Sketch of the proof
Here, we outline the main idea of the proof. The proof basically comprises
the following two steps.
First, we construct a Harsanyi type space T ∈ Tε analogous to the level-k
theory, heuristically illustrated in Figure 1. T ki in the figure represents the
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Figure 1: Construction of Harsanyi type space T
set of “level-k types” of player i. First, we define the set of level-0 types
of the players, T 0 = T 01 × T 02 , as a belief-closed subset in which zero bias
is commonly believed. That is, any level-0 type of sender has no bias and
certainly believes that the type of receiver is in T 02 . Also, any level-0 type
of receiver certainly believes that the type of sender is in T 01 , and therefore,
believes that d = 0 for certain.
We then define the successive levels as follows. Each level-1 type of sender
has bias d ∈ D, and certainly believes that the type of receiver is in T 02 ; that
is, the sender could be biased, but he certainly believes that the receiver
believes d = 0. On the other hand, any level-1 type of receiver certainly
believes that the type of sender is in T 11 ; that is, the receiver believes that
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the sender: (i) could be biased; and (ii) believes that the receiver has a level-
0 type. Likewise, any level-2 type of sender could be biased and certainly
believes that the type of receiver is in T 12 , and any level-2 type of receiver
certainly believes that the sender’s type is in T 21 , and so on. We then define
Ti =
⋃∞
k=0 T
k
i . One interpretation may be that a level-0 type is the “naive”
type who believes that there is no conflict in their preferences. A type of
sender in T k1 tries to best respond to a type of receiver in T
k−1
2 , and a type
of receiver in T k2 tries to best respond to a type of sender in T
k
1 .
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As the second step, given the Harsanyi type space T constructed above,
we construct a PBE with Property FR0 (hence, we obtain existence). Fur-
thermore, we show that A(θ|σ∗) = A for any θ in any PBE σ∗ with Property
FR0.
The idea of the proof of this second step is as follows. Let Ak(θ|σ∗) denote
the set of actions that the receiver in T k2 can play in an equilibrium if she
receives message m = θ. First, because zero bias is commonly believed in T0,
Property FR0 implies that the sender with a level-0 type reports θ truthfully,
and then the receiver with a level-0 type takes a = θ. Hence, A0(θ|σ∗) = {θ}
for any θ.
17 Although our construction of the type space is analogous to that often used in the
level-k theory (see Stahl and Wilson (1994, 1995), and Nagel (1995); see Crawford (2003)
for its application to strategic communication), interpreting the hierarchical levels as the
players’ strategic sophistication may not be sensible. For example, the players with type 0
in our type space play an equilibrium, and in this sense they are strategically sophisticated.
Rather, the level here may be interpreted as a measure of distance from the base model
where d = 0 is common knowledge. Strzalecki (2014) adopts the level-k construction to
represent each player’s higher-order beliefs about the opponents’ depth of reasoning.
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Now, for the sender with a level-1 type, if he is biased, then he may report
untruthfully. In particular, because the sender believes that the receiver has
a level-0 type, he reports θ plus his bias. Given this, because the receiver
with a level-1 type believes that the sender is of such a type, she adjusts
the action according to the bias that she believes, that is, her action is
the reported message minus the believed amount of the bias. As a result,
A1(θ|σ∗) = [θ − ε, θ + ε] for any θ. But then, because the sender with a
level-2 type expects such a discounting by the receiver, he would exaggerate
his message even more so that the message he sends is the true payoff-state
plus his bias plus the discount made by the receiver. Because the receiver
with a level-2 type expects such an exaggeration, she discounts more. As a
result, A2(θ|σ∗) = [θ − 2ε, θ + 2ε] for any θ. By induction, it is shown that
Ak(θ|σ∗) = [θ − kε, θ + kε] for any θ. Because A = ⋃k Ak(θ|σ∗) ⊆ A(θ|σ∗),
A(θ|σ∗) = A for any θ.18
Remark 1. Note that, on the equilibrium path, the receiver’s belief (on Θ)
and actions vary with respect to received messages. In this sense, communi-
cation plays a nontrivial role in σ∗, especially given the type of the receiver
being fixed. In this sense, potential failure of communication in our con-
struction is fundamentally different from a “babbling equilibrium” (i.e., an
equilibrium where the sender sends the same message regardless of θ, and
18The same result holds even if each level-k type of a player has a non-degenerate belief
over any type of the opponent with level k′ where k′ < k, because the best response given
such a belief is represented by a convex combination of the best responses with degenerate
beliefs.
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the receiver plays a = E(θ) for any received message), where the receiver’s
belief and action are invariant, given whatever messages are observed.
Remark 2. As demonstrated in Theorem 1, messages sent by the sender
with level-k types in equilibrium σ∗ are more exaggerated compared with
that which the level-0 types send as k increases. This phenomenon may be
related to language inflation of Kartik, Ottaviani, and Squintani (2007) and
Kartik (2009). In their papers, cheap-talk games are transformed into costly-
signaling games by introducing naive receivers or lying costs, which makes
each message have its own “intrinsic” meaning. They then define language
inflation based on this intrinsic meaning. Our work, in contrast, is about
pure cheap-talk games where a message does not have any intrinsic meaning,
and thus, it is difficult to formally define language inflation and discuss a
connection to their work. Nevertheless, our exercise demonstrates that (a
broad sense of) language inflation can be a link between divergent interpre-
tation and divergent prediction, and make them complementary. To the best
of our knowledge, this feature of language inflation is not well investigated
in the literature.
Remark 3. While one might think of Theorem 1 as reminiscent of Wein-
stein and Yildiz (2007), we would like to emphasize that our result is not
a direct implication from their result. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) consider
“nearby” common knowledge situations that are different from the “approx-
imate” common knowledge of ours. Specifically, in their type space, there
exists some finite k where each player’s k-th order belief is arbitrarily differ-
19
ent from the baseline common-knowledge case. This k corresponds to their
notion of proximity to the baseline common-knowledge case, but notice that
k cannot be infinite in any “nearby” type space. Indeed, such arbitrariness at
some finite order k is essential for their result that any rationalizable action
can be a uniquely equilibrium action for any nearby type space in their sense.
However, clearly, such a type space is not in Tε. Our “approximate” com-
mon knowledge situation is more restricted in the sense that any acceptable
beliefs must be consistent with the common knowledge that the bias parame-
ter is sufficiently closed to zero. Such an event cannot be common knowledge
in the construction of Weinstein and Yildiz (2007). Thus, in principle, the
set of predictable actions in our approach could be much smaller than that
under the approach by Weinstein and Yildiz (2007).19
3.2 Type spaces with common priors
While Theorem 1 shows that the set of equilibrium actions is unbounded,
one may have some concerns about it. First, the maximal miscommunica-
tion seems to heavily depend on the particular Harsanyi type space con-
19To further clarify the difference, it may be useful to consider some different games
from cheap-talk games studied in this paper, where these two approaches generate different
predictions. For example, imagine a classical “battle-of-the sexes” game, where each agent
earns a positive payoff if they play the same action, while failing to do so results in zero
payoff. In a type space considered in Weinstein and Yildiz (2007), any action of each player
is rationalizable, and hence can be some type’s unique equilibrium action. However, in
our case, with a sufficiently small payoff perturbation, both players’ coordinating on a
(strict) Nash equilibrium of the baseline game is an equilibrium. This is precisely due to
the property that the nontrivial event that the payoff parameter is close to the baseline
case is indeed common knowledge.
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structed above. In particular, the construction of our Harsanyi type space is
analogous to level-k theory, and we assign infinite belief hierarchies involv-
ing systematically wrong beliefs, which may seem a very special type space.
Second, because we do not assume a common prior over the type space, The-
orem 1 is silent on which actions in the obtained unbounded support are
“more likely” than others. In this sense, it is ambiguous how far the equilib-
rium exhibiting the maximal miscommunication is from the fully revealing
equilibrium focused on the baseline scenario. To answer these questions, we
consider an environment where there is a common prior over the type space,
and demonstrate that the maximal miscommunication could happen even in
such a common prior framework. Furthermore, we show that the welfare
measured by the receiver’s ex ante expected utility is significantly different
from that of the fully revealing equilibrium even though we consider only
small departure from (exact) common knowledge about the bias is slightly.
Throughout this section, the baseline model is modified as follows. We
assume that Harsanyi type space T = (T1, T2, b1, b2) admits a common prior
φ ∈ ∆(T ). That is, for any i, bi(·|ti) ∈ ∆(T−i) coincides with the conditional
probability distribution φ(·|ti) ∈ ∆(T−i). The analysis of this model is more
complicated than that of the baseline model for the following reasons. First,
the receiver’s belief updating is two-dimensional: with a message from the
sender, the receiver updates her belief jointly about the true payoff-type and
the bias. Second, Property FR0 does not have much bite with a common
prior: if zero bias is commonly believed in a subset of types, then it is
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indeed probability zero that a receiver with such a type faces with a biased
sender, which induces nothing interesting. The following modification is
made in order to circumvent these issues. First, we assume that the payoff-
state follows an improper uniform distribution µ ∈ ∆(Θ), which drastically
simplifies the updating of the state part.20 Second, we adopt a weaker version
of Property FR0 defied as follows.
Definition 3. For η > 0, a PBE σ∗ given T has Property FR-η if the
following is satisfied: for any t1 ∈ T1 and t2 ∈ T2 such that (i) θ(t1) = θ and
(ii) zero bias is commonly-η believed, we have σ∗(t1) = θ and σ∗2(t2,m) = m.
The following proposition shows that a similar (though weaker version
of) maximal miscommunication could happen even in this common prior
framework, which suggests that absence of a common prior itself is not the
crucial source of this phenomenon, but rather relaxation of the common
knowledge of the bias parameter is. Define δ(ε) = (1− ε)/ε2.
Proposition 1. For any ε > 0, there exists T ∈ T ε which admits a common
prior φ ∈ ∆(T ) under which there exists a PBE with Property FR-(1/(1+ε2))
such that (i) A(θ|σ∗) = [θ − δ(ε), θ + δ(ε)], and (ii) the receiver’s ex ante
expected utility is V (σ∗) = −(1− ε)2/(3ε).21
The sketch of the proof is as follows. Consider the following type space
T˜ . Given ε > 0, let T˜ 01 = Θ × {0}, T˜ 11 = Θ × (D\{0}), T˜ 02 = {0}, and
20Admittedly it is a restrictive assumption, and in this sense, the result in this section
is not more than a suggestive exercise. Whether we obtain similar results with other µ is
important but well beyond the scope of the paper.
21Note that, as ε→ 0, we have δ(ε)→∞ and −(1− ε)2/(3ε)→ −∞.
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T˜ 12 = D\{0}. For any i, define T˜i = T˜ 0i ∪T˜ 1i . The belief of each type is defined
as follows. The sender with type t1 = (θ, 0) has no bias, knows payoff-state
θ, and certainly believes that the receiver is type t2 = 0. Likewise, the sender
with type t1 = (θ, d) has bias d ̸= 0, knows payoff-state θ, and believes that
the receiver’s type is t2 = 0 with probability ε
3/(1 − ε), and and t2 = d
with probability (1 − ε − ε3)/(1 − ε), respectively. In contrast, the receiver
with type t2 = 0 believes that (i) the payoff-state follows improper uniform
distribution µ ∈ ∆(Θ), and independent of that, (ii) the bias is 0 with
probability 1/(1 + ε)2, and it is uniformly distributed over D\{0} with the
remaining probability. Also, the receiver of type t2 = d(̸= 0) believes that
the payoff-state follows distribution µ, but she certainly believes that the bias
is d. With simple algebra, it is easy to confirm that this type space admits
a common prior. In particular, conditional on θ, the distribution of types is
summarized as in Table 1.
We can show that the following is a PBE in this type space by the stan-
dard argument.
σ∗1(θ, d) = θ +
1− ε
ε3
d, (5)
σ∗2(t2,m) = m−
1− ε
ε3
t2. (6)
Notice that for the sender of type t1 = (θ, 0) and the receiver of type t2 =
0, zero bias is commonly-(1/(1 + ε2)) believed, and the sender reports θ
truthfully and the receiver who observes message m takes action a = m in
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Table 1: The type distribution conditional on θ
this equilibrium. That is, this equilibrium satisfies Property FR-1/(1 + ε2).
Because, conditional on θ, the sender of type t1 = (θ, d) plays with the
receiver of type t2 = 0 with density ε
2/2 for any d ∈ D\{0}, action a =
θ+(1− ε)d/ε3 is played in this equilibrium. With the remaining probability,
the receiver correctly infers the correct payoff-state, and then a = θ is played.
Therefore, we obtain that A(θ|σ∗) = [θ− δ(ε), θ, θ+ δ(ε)], and the receiver’s
ex ante expected utility V (σ∗) = −(1− ε)2/(3ε).
The main message of this proposition is similar to that of Theorem 1. As
for the equilibrium constructed in Theorem 1, this equilibrium also exhibits
the maximal miscommunication in the sense that A(θ|σ∗) tends to the en-
tire action set A and the receiver’s ex ante expected utility tends to −∞ as
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ε → 0. That is, this proposition also shows that communication is signif-
icantly distorted even though the disagreement over the bias is arbitrarily
small. In particular, the equilibrium constructed here is quite different from
the fully revealing equilibrium in terms of the ex ante welfare. In the fully
revealing equilibrium, the receiver’s ex ante expected utility is 0, which is the
best scenario for the receiver. In contrast, in the equilibrium constructed in
Proposition 1, the ex ante expected utility tends to −∞, which is the worst
case for the receiver. This difference demonstrates that our equilibrium is
opposite to the fully revealing equilibrium in this probabilistic framework.22
4 The complementarity of divergent interpre-
tation and divergent prediction
4.1 Definition
We have thus far discussed the possibility of maximal miscommunication
that arises because of the lack of common priors over the bias. As mentioned
above, this phenomenon seems to be related to the complementary nature of
divergent interpretation and divergent prediction. In this section, we investi-
gate this observation. To formally define our notion of divergent interpreta-
22However, Proposition 1 is weaker than Theorem 1 because the type space varies with ε
and improper uniform distribution µ is necessary. Furthermore, this proposition does not
assure that any equilibrium satisfying Property FR-η exhibits the maximal miscommuni-
cation. Because the comprehensive analysis for common-prior type spaces is well beyond
the scope of this paper, it is left for future research.
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tion and divergent prediction, we introduce the following additional notation
and technical assumptions. Hereafter, we assume the payoff-state follows a
full-support common prior distribution µ ∈ ∆(Θ) with a finite mean. That
is, for any t2 ∈ T2, bΘ2 (·|t2) = µ(·) holds, where bΘ2 ∈ ∆(Θ) is the receiver’s
marginal belief about θ.23 Fix some ε > 0, a Harsanyi type space T ∈ Tε,
and a (measurable, pure-strategy) equilibrium σ. Given σ1, the receiver with
type t2 can form a joint belief over Θ×D ×M , based on b2(t2). Let bM2 (t2)
denote its marginal over M , i.e., for each measurable E ⊆M :
bM2 (E|t2) =
∫
T1
1{σ1(t1) ∈ E}db2(t1|t2). (7)
Similarly, given σ2, for each t1 ∈ T1, m ∈ M , and measurable E ′ ⊆ A,
let:
bA1 (E
′|t1,m) =
∫
T2
1{σ2(t2,m) ∈ E ′}db1(t2|t1), (8)
denote the sender’s belief about the receiver’s action choices when the sender
has type t1 and sends messagem. Let M˜ = {m ∈M |∃t1 ∈ T1 s.t. σ1(t1) = m}
be the set of on-path messages in σ. In the following, for each S ⊆ Θ with
µ(S) > 0, E[θ|θ ∈ S] represents the conditional expected value of θ given
θ ∈ S with respect to µ, that is, E[θ|θ ∈ S] = (∫
S
θdµ
)
/µ(S) ∈ R.
23Formally, for each measurable set E′ ⊆ Θ:
bΘ2 (E
′|t2) =
∫
T1
1{θ(t1) ∈ E′}db2(t1|t2).
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For simplicity, we only consider equilibria satisfying the following condi-
tions: (i) for each t2 ∈ T2, the support of bM2 (t2) coincides with M˜ ; and (ii)
there is no redundant message, that is, for any m,m′ ∈ M˜ with m ̸= m′,
there exists type t1 ∈ T1 such that:
∫
T2
(σ2(t2,m)− θ(t1)− d(t1))2db1(t2|t1) ̸=
∫
T2
(σ2(t2,m
′)− θ(t1)− d(t1))2db1(t2|t1).
(9)
Condition (i) guarantees that the receiver can form a conditional belief
over Θ×D given anym ∈ M˜ , which we denote by bΘ×D2 (t2,m). Condition (ii)
is imposed in order to avoid unnecessary complexity because of the sender’s
complete indifference. We believe that this non-redundancy condition is not
very demanding, in that violation of (ii) implies that the sender is indifferent
between m and m′ regardless of his type.
Definition 4. An equilibrium σ exhibits divergent interpretation if there
exist types t2, t
′
2 ∈ T2 of the receiver and m ∈ M˜ such that:
bΘ×D2 (t2,m) ̸= bΘ×D2 (t′2,m).
That is, there exist two types of the receiver who have divergent beliefs
over the state of nature (not the sender’s types), even if they observe the
same on-path message.24 For example, in equilibrium σ with divergent in-
24Such divergence in interpretation may be because, for example, some types of the
receiver have “wrong” beliefs. However, we take an agnostic position regarding the source
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terpretation, t2 may think that m is sent because θ is high and d is low,
while t′2 may think that it is because θ is low and d is high. Obviously, the
equilibrium σ∗ constructed in Theorem 1 exhibits divergent interpretation.
Definition 5. An equilibrium σ exhibits divergent prediction if there exist
types t1, t
′
1 ∈ T1 of the sender and m ∈ M˜ such that bA1 (t1,m) ̸= bA1 (t′1,m).
That is, there exist two types of the sender who have divergent beliefs over
the receiver’s reaction to an on-path message. For example, in equilibrium
σ with divergent prediction, t1 may think that his message “good” is taken
literally as “good”, while t′1 may think that it is much discounted. Again,
equilibrium σ∗ constructed in Theorem 1 exhibits divergent prediction.
Remark 4. As mentioned in the literature review, divergent interpreta-
tion/prediction is related to indeterminacy of indicative/imperative meaning
defined by Blume and Board (2013) in the sense that both of these concepts
capture some aspects of communication failure due to additional uncertainty.
More specifically, indeterminacy of indicative/imperative meaning describes
ex post suboptimality of equilibrium behaviors, which arises because of uncer-
tainty about the opponent’s language type. That is, because the opponent’s
language type is unknown (though its distribution is known) from one’s per-
spective, her/his decision is based on its expectation, which implies ex post
suboptimality. Likewise, divergent interpretation/prediction describes that
of this divergence, and focus on its consequence. The same remark applies to the concept
of divergent prediction below.
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different types have different beliefs about the opponent’s behavior. Due to
this disagreement, some types may play ex post suboptimal behavior.
While divergent interpretation/prediction is defined as disagreement of
beliefs, such disagreements are unnecessary for indeterminacy of indicative/imperative
meaning because it is defined directly as deviations from the ex post opti-
mality due to uncertainty about language types. To be more precise, for ex-
ample, consider a common-interest cheap-talk game in which only the sender
has nontrivial language types governed by a common prior. In this model,
as shown by Blume and Board (2013), indeterminacy of indicative mean-
ing might occur, but divergent interpretation/prediction do not. Because
the receiver’s belief should be based on the common prior over the sender’s
language type, there is no room for belief disagreement.
4.2 Results
Recall that, in the standard cheap-talk setting, A(θ|σ) is a singleton for (al-
most) every θ in any equilibrium σ. In this sense, the size of this set, for
each θ or in expectation with respect to θ, captures the consequence of di-
vergent interpretation or divergent prediction. As demonstrated in Theorem
1, A(θ|σ∗) could be unbounded if an equilibrium exhibits both divergent in-
terpretation and divergent prediction. However, if one of the properties is
absent in equilibrium σ, then A(θ|σ) is never unbounded.
Theorem 2. For any type space T ∈ Tε and equilibrium σ that does not
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exhibit divergent interpretation or divergent prediction, A(θ|σ) is bounded
for every θ.
Theorem 2 says that, as opposed to the case considered in Theorem 1, the
“infinite” size of miscommunication does not occur unless there exist both
divergent prediction and divergent interpretation. Notice that the statement
includes not only cases of certain bias, but also those of uncertain bias (with
or without a common prior for the bias parameter). Even in such cases, the
“infinite” size of miscommunication does not occur. In this sense, comple-
mentarity of divergent interpretation and divergent prediction is crucial. In-
tuitively, the boundedness arises from the fact that the effect of higher-order
uncertainty is drastically limited in the absence of one of the properties.
Although the formal proof is in Appendix A, one of the key observations to
obtain this result is that, with the combination of Condition (ii) and the lack
of divergent interpretation or divergent prediction, the equilibrium message of
the sender with type t1 becomes only a function of x = θ(t1) + d(t1). Hence,
any payoff-irrelevant information contained in t1 (such as his higher-order
beliefs) does not play any role. This is in stark contrast to the equilibrium
constructed in Theorem 1, where higher-order beliefs play a central role for
unbounded A(θ|σ∗). Given this observation, the boundedness of A(θ|σ) is
derived by a similar argument as in the standard cheap-talk games.
In general, the size of A(θ|σ) can be large (even though bounded) at least
for some θ. For example, even in the standard setting without uncertain bias,
imagine a two-partition equilibrium and type θ who is indifferent between the
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two messages. However, in this standard setting, such indifferent types are
“rare” with respect to the probability measure µ, as long as µ is absolutely
continuous. Similarly, in our setting with uncertain bias, the µ-weighted
average size of A(θ|σ) is small (in the sense made explicit below), under the
following regularity conditions.
Assumption 1. µ admits a (full-support) Lipschitz-continuous density func-
tion f with convex tails.25
Theorem 3. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, for any δ > 0, there
exists ε > 0 such that for any type space T ∈ Tε and any equilibrium σ that
does not exhibit either divergent interpretation or divergent prediction, there
exist c1, c2 ∈ R, such that:
µ([c1, c2]) > 1− δ, and (10)
E[supA∗(θ)− inf A∗(θ)|θ ∈ [c1, c2]] < δ. (11)
Theorem 3 says that the expected size of A(θ|σ) (except for a set of θ in
the tails whose probability can be made arbitrarily small) can be bounded
with an arbitrary small bound δ > 0, as long as µ satisfies the regularity
condition. Therefore, we conclude that, even if the players face (high-order)
25f has convex tails if there exists c ≥ 0 such that f is convex on (−∞,−c) and (c,∞).
Many popular parametric density functions satisfy this property (as well as Lipschitz
continuity). See, for example, Lam and Mottet (2016).
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uncertainty, if only divergent interpretation or divergent prediction occurs,
it has little impact on communication.
Remark 5. While our focus is the complementary nature of divergent in-
terpretation and divergent prediction itself, the characterization of each phe-
nomenon seems an interesting open question. An obvious sufficient condition
(on the primitive) for not having these phenomena is to assume a common
prior, denoted φ ∈ ∆(Θ × D), over the payoff-state and the bias, as in the
standard cheap-talk models. Note that, with such a common prior, there is
no higher-order uncertainty (more precisely, conditional on the players’ first-
order beliefs, higher-order beliefs are degenerated). This is different from the
type spaces in Theorem 1 and in Proposition 1, where at least second-order
beliefs are non-degenerated.
Claim 1. If there is common prior φ ∈ ∆(Θ×D) over Θ×D, then any equi-
librium exhibits neither divergent interpretation nor divergent prediction.
Notice that when d is common knowledge or it follows a common prior
even if it is uncertain, the receiver’s reaction is uniquely determined indepen-
dent of her type. Thus, no equilibrium exhibits divergent prediction. Fur-
thermore, because divergent prediction never appears, the receiver’s behavior
is uniquely specified, which means that it is unnecessary for the sender to
distinguish the receiver’s types. As a consequence, no equilibrium exhibits
divergent prediction. Because the comprehensive characterization of these
phenomena is well beyond the scope of this paper, it is left for future re-
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search.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper studies a certain class of cheap-talk games a` la Crawford and
Sobel (1982), where it is common knowledge that the bias parameter is close
to zero. We show the following results. First, there exists a type space in
which for any PBE where full revelation occurs among the types of players
who commonly believe the bias to be zero, any action may be played by some
type of receiver in any payoff-state. This result may be interpreted as max-
imal miscommunication. We also demonstrate that a similar phenomenon
could happen even if a common prior over the type space is assumed, where
the equilibrium is quite different from the fully revealing equilibrium in terms
of the ex ante welfare. Thus, we insist that the main reason of such a miscom-
munication is the high-order uncertainty for the bias parameter. Second, we
show that such significant miscommunication is a consequence of the comple-
mentary nature of divergent interpretation and divergent prediction. That
is, if one of these properties is absent, then the size of miscommunication
is much smaller even if players face higher-order uncertainty. These results
shed light on the potential welfare impacts of divergent interpretation and
divergent prediction in cheap-talk communication.
There are two concluding remarks. First, our first result is shown in a
rather unique setting. For example, the sets of states and actions are un-
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bounded, and d = 0 (rather than some nonzero value) is fixed as a “bench-
mark” case. It is left open for future research as to how much our result
generalizes to alternative specifications in this manner.
Additionally, we focus on the fully revealing equilibrium among many
other equilibria when d = 0 is common knowledge. It would be interesting
to study if similar results hold even if we assume other (non-fully revealing)
equilibrium behaviors in the base model. If the conclusion ends up varying
across different assumptions on the equilibrium behaviors, the methodology
offered in this paper could be interpreted as providing a new dimension in
which to compare equilibria in the base model, based on behavior in nearby
environments. This may be useful for arguing equilibrium selection and the
ranking of equilibria.
A related question is whether or not a similar interaction of divergent
interpretation and divergent prediction occurs in other environments. This
paper focuses on a cheap-talk environment, but the fundamental concept of
this paper also applies to various other environments. For example, in a
companion paper, Miura and Yamashita (2014) show a similar result in a
costly-signaling example, a` la Spence (1973). More specifically, if we assume
that a fully-separating equilibrium occurs when the model parameters are
common knowledge, any outcome is possible in any payoff-state in nearby
environments. Because the comprehensive analysis in a general environment
is beyond the scope of this paper, it is left for future research.
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Appendix A: Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We first construct T = (T1, T2, b1, b2) as follows. First, let T 01 = {t01(θ)|θ ∈ Θ}
be a subset of types of the sender, which we refer to as “level-0” types, where
for each θ, t01(θ) is a type of the sender who:(i) has d = 0; (ii) knows the
payoff-state θ; and (iii) believes that the receiver’s type is in T 02 , that is:
d(t01(θ)) = 0, θ(t
0
1(θ)) = θ, and b1(T
0
2 |t01(θ)) = 1. (12)
Let T 02 = {t02}, where t02 is a “level-0” type of the receiver, who believes that
the sender’s type is in T 01 (i.e., b2(T
0
1 |t02) = 1).26 Note that d = 0 is commonly
believed among them.
Next, for each d ∈ D, let T 11 (d) = {t11(d, θ)|θ ∈ Θ} be another subset of
types of the sender (“level-1” types), where for each θ, t11(d, θ) is a type of
the sender who: (i) has the bias d; (ii) knows the payoff-state θ; and (iii)
believes that the receiver’s type is t02 for certain, that is:
d(t11(d, θ)) = d, θ(t
1
1(d, θ)) = θ, and b1(T
0
2 |t11(d, θ)) = 1. (13)
Let T 11 =
⋃
d∈D T
1
1 (d). Likewise, let T
1
2 = {t12(d)|d ∈ D} be a set of “level-1”
types of the receiver, where for each d ∈ D, t12(d) believes that the sender’s
26By assumption, t02 believes that the sender’s type is certainly t
0
1(θ) when the payoff-
state is θ.
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type is in T 11 (d) (i.e., b2(T
1
1 (d)|t12(d)) = 1).27
Inductively, given T k2 for each k = 1, 2, . . ., let T
k+1
1 be another subset of
the sender’s types (“level-(k + 1)” types) as follows. First, for each d ∈ D
and t2 ∈ T k2 , let T k+11 (d, t2) = {tk+11 (d, θ, t2)|θ ∈ Θ} be a subset of types of
the sender, where for each θ, tk+11 (d, θ, t2) is a type of the sender who: (i) has
the bias d; (ii) knows the payoff-state θ; and (iii) believes that the receiver’s
type is t2 for certain, that is:
d(tk+11 (d, θ, t2)) = d, θ(t
k+1
1 (d, θ, t2)) = θ, and b1(t2|tk+11 (d, θ, t2)) = 1. (14)
Let T k+11 =
⋃
d∈D,t2∈Tk2 T
k+1
1 (d, t2).
Similarly, let T k+12 = {tk+12 (d, t2)|d ∈ D, t2 ∈ T k2 } be another subset
of the receiver’s types (“level-(k + 1)” types), where for each d ∈ D and
t2 ∈ T k2 , tk+12 (d, t2) believes that the sender’s type is in T k+11 (d, t2) (i.e.,
b2(T
k+1
1 (d, t2)|tk+12 (d, t2)) = 1).28 We complete the description of the type
space by defining Ti =
⋃∞
k=0 T
k
i for each i.
Now we consider any PBE σ∗ given this type space with Property FR0,
and then show that A(θ|σ∗) = A for any θ ∈ Θ. Let Ak(θ|σ∗) denote the set
of actions that the receiver in T k2 can play in equilibrium σ
∗ if she receives
27By assumption, t12(d) believes that the sender’s type is t
1
1(d, θ) for certain when the
payoff-state is θ.
28By assumption, tk+12 (d, t2) believes that the sender’s type is t
k+1
1 (d, θ, t2) for certain
when the payoff-state is θ.
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message m = θ, which is defined by:
Ak(θ|σ∗) = {a ∈ A∣∣∃t2 ∈ T k2 s.t. a = σ∗2(t2|θ)} . (15)
Notice that
⋃
k A
k(θ|σ∗) ⊆ A(θ|σ∗) for every θ.
Without loss of generality, we assume that σ∗1(t
0
1(θ)) = θ for each θ ∈ Θ,
and σ∗2(t
0
2,m) = m for each m ∈M . Obviously, A0(θ|σ∗) = {θ} for each θ.
For the sender with t11(d, θ) ∈ T 11 , because he believes the receiver’s type
is t02, his unique best response is to send σ
∗
1(t
1
1(d, θ)) = θ + d. Given this,
consider the receiver with type t12(d) ∈ T 12 where d ∈ D. Because the receiver
believes the sender’s type is one of those in T 11 (d), her unique best response
is σ∗2(t
1
2,m) = m− d. Hence, A1(θ|σ∗) = [θ − ε, θ + ε] for any θ.
By induction, suppose that, for each k = 1, 2, . . ., and for each δk ∈
[−kε, kε], there exists t2 ∈ T k2 such that σ∗2(t2,m) = m− δk for each m ∈M .
Consider the sender with type tk+11 (d, θ, t2) ∈ T k+11 (d, t2) for some d ∈ D and
θ ∈ Θ. Because he believes that the receiver’s type is t2, his unique best
response is to send σ∗1(t
k+1
1 (d, θ, t2)) = θ + d + δk. Given this, consider the
receiver with type tk+12 (d
′, t2) ∈ T k+12 where d′ ∈ D. Because she believes
the sender’s type is one of those in T k+11 (d
′, t2), her unique best response
is σ∗2(t
k+1
2 (d
′, t2),m) = m − d′ − δk ∈ [m − (k + 1)ε,m + (k + 1)ε]. Hence,
Ak+1(θ|σ∗) = [θ − (k + 1)ε, θ + (k + 1)ε] for any θ.
Therefore,
⋃
k A
k(θ|σ∗) = R(= A) ⊆ A(θ|σ∗) for every θ. That is,
A(θ|σ∗) = A for every θ. □
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Fix ε > 0, arbitrarily, and we first construct type space T˜ = (T˜1, T˜2, b˜1, b˜2)
as follows. Let T˜ 01 = Θ×{0}, T˜ 11 = Θ×D\{0}, T˜ 02 = {0}, and T˜ 12 = D\{0}.
For any i, define T˜i = T˜
0
i ∪ T˜ 1i .
Each type’s belief is described as follows. For the sender of t1 = (θ, 0), he
(i) has bias d = 0; (ii) knows payoff-state θ; and (iii) certainly believes that
the receiver’s type is t2 = 0. That is:
d(θ, 0) = d, θ(θ, 0) = θ, and b˜1(T˜
0
2 |(θ, 0)) = 1. (16)
For the receiver of type t2 = 0, she believes that (i) the payoff-state
follows improper uniform distribution µ ∈ ∆(Θ), and independent of that,
(ii) the bias is 0 with probability 1/(1 + ε2), and it is uniformly distributed
over D\{0} with the remaining probability. That is:
b˜Θ2 (·|t2 = 0) = µ(·|t2 = 0),
b˜D2 (d|t2 = 0) =

(ε2 + dε)/[2(1 + ε2)] if d ∈ [−ε, 0),
(2 + ε2)/[2(1 + ε2)] if d = 0,
(2 + ε2 + dε)/[2(1 + ε2)] if d ∈ (0, ε],
(17)
where b˜D2 (t2 = 0) represents a cumulative distribution function over D.
For the sender of type t1 = (θ, d) with d ∈ D\{0}, he (i) has bias d; (ii)
knows payoff-state θ; and (iii) believes that the receiver’s type is 0 and d
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with probabilities ε3/(1− ε) and (1− ε− ε3)/(1− ε), respectively. That is:
d(θ, d) = d, θ(θ, d) = θ,
b˜1(t2) =

ε3/(1− ε) if t2 = 0,
(1− ε− ε3)/(1− ε) if t2 = d,
0 otherwise.
(18)
For the receiver of type t2 = d with d ∈ D\{0}, she believes that (i) the
payoff-state follows improper uniform distribution µ, and (ii) the sender’s
bias is d for certain. That is,
b˜Θ2 (·|t2 = d) = µ(·),
b˜D2 (d
′|t2 = d) =
 0 if d
′ ∈ [−ε, d),
1 otherwise.
. (19)
Notice that this type space admits a common prior. In particular, one
can show that the distribution over the type space conditional one θ is sum-
marized as in Table 1.
Next, we show that the following strategies constitute a PBE satisfying
Property FR-(1/(1 + ε2)).
σ∗1(θ, d) = θ +
1− ε
ε3
d, (20)
σ∗2(t2,m) = m−
1− ε
ε3
t2. (21)
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Notice that the sender with type t1 = (θ, 0) and the receiver with type
t2 = d ∈ D\{0} essentially “knows” the opponent type. Hence, given the
opponent strategy, it is obvious that their behaviors are the best responses.
For the sender of type t1 = (θ, d) with d ∈ D\{0}, he faces either type
t2 = 0 (who plays a = m) with probability ε
3/(1 − ε) or t2 = d (who plays
a = m − (1 − ε)d/ε3) with the remaining probability. Hence, his expected
utility from message m is
− ε
3
1− ε(m− θ − d)
2 − 1− ε− ε
3
1− ε
(
m− 1− ε
ε3
d− θ − d
)2
. (22)
By the first-order condition, his best response is m = θ + (1− ε)d/ε3.
Finally, consider the best response of the receiver with type t2 = 0. Be-
cause we assume improper uniform distribution µ as a prior over the payoff-
state, the receiver’s belief updating about θ is straightforward. Hence, given
message m, the receiver’s ex ante expected utility from action a is
− 1
1 + ε2
(a−m)2 −
∫ ε
−ε
(
a−m+ 1− ε
ε3
d˜
)2
ε
2(1 + ε2)
dd˜. (23)
By the first-order condition, her best response is a = m. Thus, these strate-
gies constitute a PBE. Furthermore, for the sender of type t1 = (θ, 0) and
the receiver of type t2 = 0, zero bias is commonly 1/(1+ε
2) believed. Hence,
PBE σ∗ satisfies Property FR-(1/(1 + ε2)).
In this equilibrium, conditional on θ, the sender of bias d plays with the
receiver of type t2 = 0 with density ε
2/2 for any d ∈ D\{0}. In this scenario,
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action a = θ + (1 + ε)d/ε3 is played. Because the receiver correctly infer
the true payoff-state with the remaining probability, the equilibrium action
is a = θ. As a result, A(θ|σ∗) = [θ − δ(ε), θ + δ(ε)]. Therefore, conditional
on θ, the receiver’s ex ante expected utility is
−(1− ε3)(θ − θ)2 −
∫ ε
−ε
(
θ +
1− ε
ε3
d˜− θ
)2
ε2
2
dd˜ = −(1− ε)
2
3ε
. (24)
Because this value is independent of payoff-state θ, the receiver’s ex ante
expected utility is given by V (σ∗) = −(1− ε)2/(3ε). □
A.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Fix arbitrary Harsanyi type space T and equilibrium σ that does not exhibit
either divergent interpretation or divergent prediction. Then, for any on-path
message m ∈ M˜ , the sender of any type believes the same reaction of the
receiver, i.e., bA1 (t1,m) does not vary with t1 ∈ T1.29 Therefore, we denote it
by bA1 (m).
By Condition (ii), for anym,m′ ∈ M˜ , there exists t1 satisfying (9), which,
together with the no-divergent-prediction condition, implies:
∫
A
a dbA1 (a|m) ̸=
∫
A
a dbA1 (a|m′), (25)
29If an equilibrium does not exhibit divergent interpretation, then every type of the
receiver responds in the same way. Hence, the difference in the sender’s belief does not
matter.
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that is, the mean actions are different.30 Without loss of generality, in what
follows, we identify each message m ∈ M˜ with the mean action induced
by it, that is, m =
∫
A
a dbA1 (m). Furthermore, the no-divergent-prediction
condition implies that the sender’s types t1, t
′
1 with x = θ(t1) + d(t1) =
θ(t′1) + d(t
′
1) have the same preference ordering over M˜ . Thus, let M˜(x)
denote the set of best-response messages for the sender with x = θ(t1)+d(t1).
We call this x a “virtual type” of the sender with t1. Notice that M˜(x) is
non-empty for any x, and inf M˜(x) and sup M˜(x) are increasing in x.
For each m ∈ M˜ , let X(m) = {x ∈ R|m ∈ M˜(x)} denote the set of
virtual types who prefer message m. By the single-crossing condition, X(m)
is a convex set. Also, for each m < m′, we have supX(m) ≤ infX(m′);
otherwise, there are x ̸= x′ for whom m,m′ are both optimal, but then this
contradicts that m ̸= m′. Note that this implies inf M˜(x), sup M˜(x) ∈ R
(i.e., M˜(x) is bounded) for any x ∈ R; for example, if sup M˜(x) = ∞ for
some x, then for any x′ > x and m′ ∈ M˜(x′), there exists m ∈ M˜(x) such
that m > m′, but then the single-crossing preference implies that x′ strictly
prefers m to m′, contradicting m′ ∈ M˜(x′).
For each m ∈ M˜ , let Aˆ(m) = {σ2(t2,m)|t2 ∈ T2} be the set of possi-
ble equilibrium actions given message m. Then, we show that set Aˆ(m) is
bounded for any m ∈ M˜ as in the following lemma.
30More precisely, the no-divergent-prediction condition implies either different mean
actions (as above) or (the same mean but) different variances. However, the second case
means that either m or m′ is never played, which contradicts to m,m′ ∈ M˜ .
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Lemma 1. For each m ∈ M˜ , define:
ζ(m) =
 infX(m)− ε if infX(m) > −∞,E[θ|θ ≤ supX(m)− ε] otherwise, (26)
ζ(m) =
 supX(m) + ε if supX(m) <∞,E[θ|θ ≥ infX(m) + ε] otherwise. (27)
Then, inf Aˆ(m) ≥ ζ(m) and sup Aˆ(m) ≤ ζ(m) for any m ∈ M˜ .
Proof. (of the lemma) Fix m ∈ M˜ . Suppose that infX(m) > −∞. Because
type t1 of the sender does not send m if θ(t1) + d(t1) < infX(m), this
message m is not sent given any θ < infX(m) − ε. Therefore, inf Aˆ(m) ≥
infX(m) − ε. When infX(m) = −∞, there is a tighter (and finite) lower
bound on inf Aˆ(m). Because type t1 of the sender sends m if θ(t1) + d(t1) <
supX(m), this message m is sent given any θ < supX(m) − ε. Therefore,
given any type t2 of the receiver, her action is (weakly) higher than E[θ|θ ≤
supX(m) − ε].31 The upper bounds on sup Aˆ(m) are analogously obtained
as in the statement.
Therefore, by Lemma 1 for each θ:
A(θ|σ) ⊆ {a ∈ A|∃x ∈ [θ − ε, θ + ε],∃m ∈ M˜(x), a ∈ Aˆ(m)}
⊆ [ζ(inf M˜(θ − ε)), ζ(sup M˜(θ + ε))], (28)
31If X(m) = R, then σ is a babbling equilibrium, which implies that inf Aˆ(m) = E[θ] =∫
Θ
θdµ.
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which is bounded.32 □
A.4 Proof of Theorem 3
Fix arbitrary δ > 0 and ε > 0. Also, fix arbitrary Harsanyi type space T ∈ Tε
and equilibrium σ that does not exhibit either divergent interpretation or
divergent prediction.
By the same argument used in Theorem 2, the sender’s equilibrium mes-
sage depends only on his virtual type. In the following, because the case
with m such that X(m) = R (i.e., a babbling equilibrium) is trivial, we only
consider the other case where X(m) ⊊ R. By the Lipschitz-continuity of
density f , there exists λ > 0 such that |f(θ) − f(θ′)| ≤ λ|θ − θ′| for any
θ, θ′. Let c1, c2 ∈ R be such that: (i) Pr(θ < c1),Pr(θ > c2) ∈ (0, δ/2); (ii)
for all m ∈ M˜ with infX(m) > −∞, c1 < infX(m); (iii) for all m ∈ M˜
with supX(m) < ∞, c2 > supX(m); (iv) f is convex and increasing on
(−∞, c1), and is convex and decreasing on (c2,∞); (v) c1 < E[θ|θ < 0]
and c2 > E[θ|θ > 0]; and finally, (vi) for m ∈ M˜ with infX(m) = −∞,
supX(m) + ε < c2, and for m ∈ M˜ with supX(m) = +∞, infX(m) − ε >
c1.
33
Let f = maxx∈[c1,c2] f(x) and f = minx∈[c1,c2] f(x).
By construction, it is obvious that (10) holds. Hence, hereafter, we show
32Notice that ζ(m) and ζ(m) are increasing in m.
33These conditions hold if |c1| and |c2| are sufficiently large.
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the second part of the statement. Define M∗ = {m ∈ M˜ | supX(m) ≥
c1 − ε and infX(m) ≤ c2 + ε}. Note that any message not in M∗ can be
sent only if θ /∈ [c1, c2]. Let a(m) = inf Aˆ(m) and a(m) = sup Aˆ(m). First,
we show the following lemmas.
Lemma 2. There exists α ∈ R++ such that, for each m ∈M∗:
a(m)− a(m) ≤ αε. (29)
Proof. Fix m ∈M∗, arbitrarily, and let x = supX(m) and x = infX(m).
The following three cases are considered: (i) x ≥ c1 and x ≤ c2; (ii)
x = −∞ and x ≤ c2 − ε; and (iii) x ≥ c1 + ε and x =∞.
First, suppose that x ≥ c1 and x ≤ c2. That is, X(m) is bounded, and
also X(m) ⊆ [c1, c2].
Case 1: x− x < 3ε.
In this case, by Lemma 1:
a(m)− a(m) < ζ(m)− ζ(m) = x+ ε− (x− ε) < 5ε. (30)
Case 2: x− x ≥ 3ε.
Let η = E[θ|θ ∈ [x + ε, x− ε]] ∈ [c1, c2]. Note that µ([x + ε, x− ε]) ≥
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(x− x− 2ε)f . In this case, the following holds:
a(m) ≤ 2(x+ ε)(f2 + 2ελ)ε+ ηµ([x+ ε, x− ε])
2(f2 + 2ελ)ε+ µ([x+ ε, x− ε]) , (31)
a(m) ≥ 2(x− ε)(f1 + 2ελ)ε+ ηµ([x+ ε, x− ε])
2(f1 + 2ελ)ε+ µ([x+ ε, x− ε]) , (32)
where f1 = f(x+ ε) and f2 = f(x− ε).
Now, we consider the following two sub-cases. First, suppose that
f2 > f1. In this sub-case:
a(m)− a(m) ≤ 2ε[xf2 − xf1 + ε(f1 + f2) + 2ελ(x− x+ 2ε)]
(f1 + 2ελ)ε+ (x− x− 2ε)f
≤ 2ε(x− x)
(x− x− 2ε)f
[
f1 +
x
x− x(f2 − f1) + 2ελ
]
+
4εf + 8ε2λ
(x− x− 2ε)f ε
≤ 2(x− x)(f + λx+ 2ελ) + 4εf + 8ε
2λ
(x− x− 2ε)f ε (33)
≤ 2(x− x)
x− x− 2ε
f + λx+ 2ελ
f
ε+
4f + 8ελ
f
ε
≤
[
6(f + λx+ 2ελ) + 4f + 8ελ
f
]
ε,
where the second inequality is by (f(x+ε)+2ελ)ε > 0 and f ≥ f2; the
third inequality is by the Lipschitz-continuity; the fourth inequality is
by x−x−2ε ≥ ε; and the last inequality is by (x−x)/(x−x−2ε) ≤ 3.
Next, suppose that f2 ≤ f1. Let φ1 = µ([x+ε, x−ε])/2(f1+2ελ)ε and
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φ2 = µ([x+ ε, x− ε])/2(f2 + 2ελ)ε. Then:
a(m)− a(m) ≤ x+ ε
1 + φ2
− x− ε
1 + φ1
+
2(f1 − f2)
(x− x− 2ε)f ηε
≤ x− x+ 2ε
φ1
+
2(x− x)λ
(x− x− 2ε)f ηε
≤ 2(x− x+ 2ε)
(x− x− 2ε)f (f + 2ελ)ε+
6ηλ
f
ε (34)
≤
[
10(f + 2ελ) + 6ηλ
f
]
ε,
where the second inequality is by 1+φ2 ≥ 1+φ1 ≥ φ1 and the Lipschitz-
continuity; the third inequality is by µ([x+ ε, x− ε]) ≥ (x− x− 2ε)f ,
f1 ≤ f , and (x − x)/(x − x − 2ε) ≤ 3; and the last inequality is by
(x− x+ 2ε)/(x− x− 2ε) ≤ 5.
Next suppose that x = −∞ and (c1 + ε ≤)x ≤ c2 − ε. In this case,
a(m) = η = E[θ|θ < x− ε] > E[θ|θ < c1], and:
a(m) ≤ 2(x+ ε)(f2 + 2ελ)ε+ ηµ((−∞, x− ε])
2(f2 + 2ελ)ε+ µ((−∞, x− ε]) . (35)
Thus:
a(m)− a(m) ≤ 2(x+ ε− η)(f2 + 2ελ)ε
2(f2 + 2ελ)ε+ µ((−∞, x− ε])
≤
[
2(c2 − E[θ|θ < c1])(f + 2ελ)
µ((−∞, c1])
]
ε. (36)
Finally, Case (iii) is similar to Case (ii), and hence omitted. Therefore, it
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suffices to set α as the supremum of the threshold coefficients of ε for Cases
(i)-(iii).
Lemma 3. For each θ ∈ [c1, c2] and each m,m′ ∈
⋃
x∈[θ−ε,θ+ε] M˜(x):
a(m′)− a(m) ≤ αε+m′ −m. (37)
Proof. For each such m,m′, we have:
a(m′)− a(m) = a(m′)− a(m′) + a(m)− a(m) + a(m′)− a(m) (38)
≤ 2αε+m′ −m,
where the inequality is because of Lemma 2 and because a(m′) ≤ m′ and
a(m) ≥ m.
Lemma 4. There exist ε∗ > 0 and β > 1 such that, for each ε ∈ (0, ε∗),
θ ∈ [c1, c2] and m,m′ ∈
⋃
x∈[θ−ε,θ+ε] M˜(x), we have:
(m′ −m)µ
([
m+m′
2
− ε, m+m
′
2
+ ε
])
≤ β
∫ m′
m
µ([y − ε, y + ε])dy.
(39)
Proof. First, note that m and m′ in the statement are necessarily inM∗; oth-
erwise, it cannot be in M˜(x) for any x ∈ [θ− ε, θ+ ε] and θ ∈ [c1, c2]. There-
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fore, we never have m,m′ < c1 − ε simultaneously; otherwise, supX(m) <
c1 − ε, and hence m /∈M∗. Similarly, we never have m,m′ > c2 + ε simulta-
neously.
Furthermore, by taking ε∗ sufficiently small, we do not simultaneously
have m < c1 − ε and m′ > c2 + ε, for ε ∈ (0, ε∗). To see this, take ε∗ <
min{(c2 − c1)/2, E[θ|θ < 0]− c1, c2 − E[θ|θ > 0]}. Then, m < c1 − ε implies
m < E[θ|θ < 0], and m′ > c2 + ε implies m′ > E[θ|θ > 0]. Let ψ, ψ′ > 0
be such that m = E[θ|θ < −ψ] and m′ = E[θ|θ > ψ′], and redefine ε∗ <
min{(c2−c1)/2, E[θ|θ < 0]−c1, c2−E[θ|θ > 0], ψ, ψ′}.34 Then, for ε ∈ (0, ε∗),
there do not exist θ and m,m′ ∈ ⋃x∈[θ−ε,θ+ε] M˜(x). Now, fix ε ∈ (0, ε∗), and
let f− = minx∈[c1−2ε,c2+2ε] f(x) and f+ = maxx∈[c1−2ε,c2+2ε] f(x). Hereafter,
we focus on the following three cases: (i)m,m′ ∈ [c1−ε, c2+ε]; (ii)m < c1−ε
and m′ ∈ [c1 − ε, c2 + ε]; and (iii) m ∈ [c1 − ε, c2 + ε] and m′ > c2 + ε.
First, suppose that m,m′ ∈ [c1 − ε, c2 + ε]. In this case:
(m′ −m)µ
([
m+m′
2
− ε, m+m
′
2
+ ε
])
≤ 2ε(m′ −m)f+, (40)
and:
∫ m′
m
µ([y − ε, y + ε])dy ≥
∫ m′
m
2εf−dy = 2ε(m′ −m)f−. (41)
Thus, it is sufficient to take β > f+/f−.
Next, suppose that m < c1 − ε and m′ ∈ [c1 − ε, c2 + ε]. For z ∈ (−ε, ε),
34Because of the continuity of µ, there exist such ψ and ψ′.
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define function ξ : (m+ z,m′ + z)→ R by:
ξ(y) =
 f(y) if y ∈ (m+ z, c1 − ε],f(c1 − ε) + (y − c1 + ε)λ if y ∈ (c1 − ε,m′ + z). (42)
Notice that ξ is convex and weakly above f(y) for y ∈ (m+z,m′+z). Hence,
we have:
∫ m′+z
m+z
ξ(y)dy ≥ (m′ −m)ξ
(
m+m′
2
+ z
)
≥ (m′ −m)f
(
m+m′
2
+ z
)
. (43)
Let β be greater than or equal to (f(c1 − ε) + (c2 − c1 + 2ε)λ)/f−. Then:
β
∫ m′
m
µ([y − ε, y + ε])dy = β
∫ ε
−ε
∫ m′+z
m+z
f(y)dydz
≥ β
∫ ε
−ε
∫ m′+z
m+z
f−dydz
≥
∫ ε
−ε
∫ m′+z
m+z
(f(c1 − ε) + (c2 − c1 + 2ε)λ)dydz
≥
∫ ε
−ε
∫ m′+z
m+z
ξ(y)dydz (44)
≥
∫ ε
−ε
(m′ −m)f
(
m+m′
2
+ z
)
= (m′ −m)µ
([
m+m′
2
− ε, m+m
′
2
+ ε
])
.
Finally, Case (iii) can be shown by the similar argument used in Case
(ii), and hence it is omitted. Therefore, we complete the proof by taking β
50
greater than the maximum of the conditions above.
Recall that, for each x, M˜(x) contains either one or two elements, and
furthermore, x < x′ implies m ≤ m′ for any m ∈ M˜(x) and m′ ∈ M˜(x′); oth-
erwise, it violates single-crossing. This implies that there are only countably
many x such that M˜(x) contains two elements.35
In the following, for each x, fix m∗(x) ∈ M˜(x) arbitrarily. Note that
this m∗(x) is non-decreasing, has at most countably many discontinuities, as
discussed above. If m∗ is discontinuous at x, then the sender of type t1 with
θ(t1) + d(t1) = x is indifferent between sending m and m
′ that are included
in M˜(x). Define m = m∗(x−) and m′ = m∗(x+).
Lemma 5.
(i) If m∗(x) is discontinuous at x, then x ∈ [(m∗(x+) + m∗(x−))/2 −
αε, (m∗(x+) +m∗(x−))/2 + αε]; and
(ii) if m∗(x) is continuous at x, then either m∗ is locally constant around
x, or m∗(x) ∈ [x− ε, x+ ε].
Proof. (i) Suppose that m∗(x) is discontinuous at x. Given that bA2 (m) ∈
∆([a(m), a(m)]) and bA2 (m
′) ∈ ∆([a(m′), a(m′)]), it is necessary that x ∈
[(a(m∗(x+)) + a(m∗(x−)))/2, (a(m∗(x+)) + a(m∗(x−)))/2]. Finally, because
35To see this, let r(x) be a rational number between (min M˜(x),max M˜(x)) if M˜(x)
contains two elements (and hence this open set is non-empty). For any x < x′ such that
both M˜(x) and M˜(x′) contain two elements each, because max M˜(x) ≤ min M˜(x′), we
have r(x) < r(x′). This implies that the set of x such that M˜(x) contains two elements
cannot have a cardinality greater than that of the rational numbers.
51
m∗(y) ∈ [a(m∗(y)), a(m∗(y))] for each y, together with Lemma 2, we obtain
x ∈ [(m∗(x+) +m∗(x−))/2− αε, (m∗(x+) +m∗(x−))/2 + αε].
(ii) Suppose that m∗(x) is continuous at x, and that m∗(x) is not locally
constant, that is, there exists a sequence {xk}∞k=1 such that, for each k,
|x − xk| < 1k and m∗(x) ̸= m∗(xk). Without loss of generality, we assume
that {xk}∞k=1 is an increasing sequence, and hence m∗(xk) < m∗(x) for all
k.36
Suppose, in contrast, that x < m∗(xk) − ε(< m − ε) for some k. Be-
cause m∗(xk) =
∫
A
adbA1 (m
∗(xk)), there exists some virtual type x′k such
that m∗(xk) = x′k, and then it is obvious that m
∗(xk) ∈ M˜(x′k). By the
supposition, we have x < m∗(xk) − ε < x′k. Furthermore, by construction,
x′k weakly prefers m
∗(xk) to m∗(x), and x weakly prefers m∗(x) to m∗(xk)
(while one of them must be a strict preference; otherwise m∗(xk) = m∗(x)).
However, m∗(xk) < m∗(x) implies a contradiction to the single-crossing con-
dition. Therefore, we conclude x ≥ m∗(xk)− ε ≥ m∗(x)− 1/k − ε for all k,
and thus, x ≥ m∗(x)− ε.
On the other hand, for each k, existence of x′k as above implies that
xk−1 < x′k < m
∗(xk) + ε; if xk−1 ≥ x′k, then m∗(xk−1) /∈ M˜(xk−1) by the
single-crossing condition, which is a contradiction. Thus, x = limk xk ≤
limkm
∗(xk+1) + ε = m∗(x) + ε.
Therefore, we conclude m∗(x) ∈ [x− ε, x+ ε].
36The other case can be shown by a similar argument.
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Let X0 denote the set of x at which m
∗(x) is discontinuous. Then:
1
µ([c1, c2])
∫ c2
c1
supA∗(θ)− inf A∗(θ)dµ
≤ 1
µ([c1, c2])
∫ c2
c1
a(m∗(θ + ε))− a(m∗(θ − ε))dµ (45)
≤ 1
µ([c1, c2])
[
αε+
∫ c2
c1
m∗(θ + ε)−m∗(θ − ε)dµ
]
,
where the first inequality is by definition of a and a; and the second inequality
is by Lemma 3. Now, the inside of the bracket can be transformed as follows:
αε+
∫ c2
c1
a(m∗(θ + ε))− a(m∗(θ − ε))dµ
= αε+
∫ sup M˜
inf M˜
[∑
x∈X0
1{m ∈ (m∗(x−),m∗(x+))}µ([x− ε, x+ ε])
]
+ 1{m /∈ (m∗(x−),m∗(x+)), ∀x ∈ X0}µ([m− 2ε,m+ 2ε])dm
= αε+
∑
x∈X0
µ([x− ε, x+ ε])(m∗(x+)−m∗(x−)) (46)
+
∫ sup M˜
inf M˜
1{m /∈ (m∗(x−),m∗(x+)), ∀x ∈ X0}µ([m− 2ε,m+ 2ε])dm
≤ αε+
∑
x∈X0
β
∫ m∗(x+)
m∗(x−)
µ([m− (1 + α)ε,m+ (1 + α)ε])dm
+
∫ sup M˜
inf M˜
1{m /∈ (m∗(x−),m∗(x+)), ∀x ∈ X0}µ([m− 2ε,m+ 2ε])dm
≤ αε+ β
∫ sup M˜
inf M˜
µ([m− γε,m+ γε])dm
≤ (α + 2βγ)ε,
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where the first equality is by Lemma 5-(ii) and definition of Lebesgue integral
(i.e., integrating the probability measure that corresponds to each level of
the vertical axis); the first inequality is by Lemmas 4 and 5-(i); the second
inequality is by γ = max{2, 1 + α}; and the last inequality is by Fubini’s
theorem. Therefore:
1
µ([c1, c2])
∫ c2
c1
supA(θ|σ)− inf A(θ|σ)dµ ≤
[
α + 2βγ
µ([c1, c2])
]
ε. (47)
Therefore, it is sufficient to redefine ε so that the right hand side of (47) is
smaller than δ. □
A.5 Proof of Claim 1
Suppose that there exists common prior φ ∈ ∆(Θ × D) over Θ × D, and
fix an equilibrium σ and on-path message m ∈ M˜ , arbitrarily. Because of
the common prior assumption, b2 ({t1 ∈ T1 | θ(t1) = θ and d(t1) = d}|t2) =
φ(θ, d) holds for any t2 ∈ T2, θ ∈ Θ and d ∈ D. Hence, given message m, for
any t2 ∈ T2, conditional belief bΘ×D2 (t2,m) is
bΘ×D2 (θ, d|t2,m) =
1{σ1(t1) = m}db2(t1|t2)∫
T1
1{σ(t′1) = m}db2(t′1|t2)
,
=
1{σ1(θ, d)}dφ(θ, d)∫
Θ×D 1{σ1(θ′, d′) = m}dφ(θ′, d′)
. (48)
Thus, it is obvious that bΘ×D2 (t2,m) = b
Θ×D
2 (t
′
2,m) for any t2, t
′
2 ∈ T2 and
m ∈ M˜ , which means that equilibrium σ does not exhibits divergent inter-
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pretation.
Because of the strict concavity of utility function v in action a and infinite
action set A, no divergent interpretation implies that σ2(t2,m) = σ2(t
′
2,m) =
a holds for any t2, t
′
2 ∈ T2. Therefore, for measurable E ⊂ A and t1 ∈ T1,
bA1 (E|t1,m) =
∫
T2
1{σ2(t2,m) ∈ E}db1(t2|t1)
= 1{a ∈ E}. (49)
It is obvious that bA1 (t1,m) = b
A
1 (t
′
1,m) for any t1, t
′
1 ∈ T1 and m ∈ M˜ , which
means that equilibrium σ does not exhibit divergent prediction. Because
equilibrium σ is arbitrarily, the statement holds. □
Appendix B: More general preferences
While we have focused on the quadratic-loss preferences in the main body of
the paper, our first result, that is, maximal miscommunication, holds with
more general preferences. Let u : A × Θ × D → R and v : A × Θ → R be
the sender and the receiver’s utility functions, where we continue to assume
A = Θ = R and D = [−ε, ε]. We impose the following assumptions on u and
v.
Assumption 2. The players’ utility functions u and v satisfy that: (i)
v(a, θ) = u(a, θ, 0) for any a ∈ A and θ ∈ Θ; (ii) u is twice continuously dif-
ferentiable in each argument; (iii) u11 < 0 < u12 and u13 > 0 denoting partial
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derivatives by subscripts; and (iv) there exists a1(θ, d) = argmaxa∈A u(a, θ, d)
and a2(θ) = argmaxa∈A v(a, θ) for any θ ∈ Θ and d ∈ Dε.
Assumption 2 implies that: (i) a2(θ) = a1(θ, 0) for any θ ∈ Θ; (ii) a1(θ, d)
is unique for any θ ∈ Θ and d ∈ D; (iii) a1 is differentiable in each argument;
and (iv) a11 > 0 and a
1
2 > 0 denoting partial derivatives by subscripts. In
addition to those properties, we impose the following assumptions on the
ideal-action mapping a1. These two assumptions assure that our argument
holds beyond the quadratic-loss environment.
Assumption 3. a1(·, d) : Θ→ A is bijective for any d ∈ D.37
As in Section 3, we consider any PBE such that full revelation occurs if
d = 0 is common knowledge. As in the quadratic-loss case, we say that such
a PBE satisfies Property FR0. The only difference from the quadratic-loss
case is that, given that each θ is truthfully revealed, the receiver plays a2(θ)
(instead of θ).
Theorem 4. Suppose that Assumptions 2 and 3 hold. For each ε > 0, there
exists T ∈ Tε such that: (i) a PBE with Property FR0 exists; and (ii) for
any PBE σ∗ with Property FR0, we have A(θ|σ∗) = A for any θ ∈ Θ.
There are three remarks about the assumptions. First, Assumption 2 and
its implications are standard in the literature, for example, as in Crawford
37It is equivalent to assume that function a1(·, d) is surjective because Assumption 2-(ii)
already guarantees that a1(·, d) is injective.
56
and Sobel (1982). Second, we need Assumption 3 in order to apply the argu-
ment used in the previous section to this general environment, although it is
not standard in the literature. Assumption 3 means that any available action
can be supported as the sender’s ideal action in some state, whatever the bias
parameter d(∈ D = [−ε, ε]) is. It implies a one-to-one relationship between
observed messages and states given any fixed bias parameter. Without As-
sumption 3, A(θ|σ∗) may be bounded, and hence Theorem 4 does not hold.
In this sense, Assumption 3 is essential to our argument. Finally, it is worth
noting that the quadratic-loss model is a special case of the environment
satisfying these assumptions.
It is also obvious that equilibrium σ∗ constructed in Theorem 4 exhibits
both divergent interpretation and divergent prediction, and their comple-
mentary nature implies unbounded A(θ|σ∗) as in the quadratic-loss case.
However, the extension of Theorems 2 and 3 appears non-trivial. Because
our arguments fully exploit the structure of quadratic-loss preferences, they
cannot be directly applied to the general environment. Hence, this exercise
is left for future research.
B.1 Proof of Theorem 4
First, we introduce additional notation. For each d and θ, let νd(a
1(θ, d)) = θ.
We interpret νd(a) ∈ Θ as the payoff-state in which a is the ideal action of
the sender with bias d. Note that νd(a) is well-defined, and is continuous
both in a and in d by Assumptions 2 and 3. Moreover, ν0(a
2(θ)) = θ by
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Assumption 2-(ii).
Lemma 6. Under Assumptions 2 and 3, νd(a) is: (i) strictly increasing in a
given any d ∈ D; and (ii) strictly decreasing in d given any a ∈ A.
Proof. (i) Fix arbitrary d ∈ D and a, a′ ∈ A with a > a′. Let νd(a) = θ and
νd(a
′) = θ′. By definition, a1(θ, d) = a > a′ = a1(θ′, d). Because a11 > 0, we
have θ > θ′, or equivalently, νd(a) > νd(a′).
(ii) Fix arbitrary a ∈ A and d, d′ ∈ D with d > d′. Let νd(a) = θ and
νd′(a) = θ
′. By definition, a1(θ, d) = a1(θ′, d′) = a. Because a11 > 0, a
1
2 > 0
and d > d′, we have θ < θ′, or equivalently, νd(a) < νd′(a).
We consider the same Harsanyi’s type space T as in the proof of Theorem
1, and hence we omit its description (see the proof of Theorem 1). We now
show that A(θ|σ∗) = A for any θ ∈ Θ.
First, we consider the level-0 types of each player, that is, T 0i for i = 1, 2.
Because we assume that a fully-revealing equilibrium is played among level-0
types, their equilibrium strategies are σ∗1(t
0
1(θ)) = θ and σ
∗
2(t
0
2,m) = a
2(m),
respectively. Hence, A0(θ|σ∗) = {a2(θ)}.
Next, we consider the level-1 types of each player, that is, T 1i for i =
1, 2. Because the sender with type t11(d, θ) ∈ T 11 believes that each message
m induces action a2(m), his best response σ∗1(t
1
1(d, θ)) must be such that
a2(σ∗1(t
1
1(d, θ))) = a
1(θ, d), or equivalently, σ∗1(t
1
1(d, θ)) = ν0(a
1(θ, d)).
Then, the receiver with type t12(d) who receives message m believes that
the state is νd(a
2(m)). Thus, her best response is σ∗2(t
1
2(d),m) = a
2(νd(a
2(m))) =
58
a2(νd(σ
∗
2(t
0
2,m))). Because ν is continuous and strictly decreasing in d by
Lemma 6, we have:
d ∈ D ⇐⇒ νd(a2(θ)) ∈ [νε(a2(θ)), ν−ε(a2(θ))], (50)
and hence:
A1(θ|σ∗) = [a2(νε(a2(θ))), a2(ν−ε(a2(θ)))]
= [a2(νε(σ
∗
2(t
0
2, θ))), a
2(ν−ε(σ∗2(t
0
2, θ)))]. (51)
Note that A0(θ|σ∗) ⊊ A1(θ|σ∗) for any θ ∈ Θ.
By induction, we consider level-(k+1) types of each player, that is, T k+1i
for each i = 1, 2. As an induction hypothesis, we assume that for any θ ∈ Θ:
Ak(θ|σ∗) = [a2(νε(αk−1− (θ))), a2(ν−ε(αk−1+ (θ)))] ⊋ Ak−1(θ|σ∗) = [αk−1− (θ), αk−1+ (θ)],
where αk−1− (θ) = minA
k−1(θ|σ∗) and αk−1+ (θ) = maxAk−1(θ|σ∗). Let t2 ∈ T k2 .
Because the sender with type tk+11 (d, θ, t2) believes that each message m
induces action σ∗2(t2,m), his best response σ
∗
1(t
k+1
1 (d, θ, t2)) must be such
that σ∗2(t2, σ
∗
1(t
k+1
1 (d, θ, t2))) = a
1(θ, d).
Then, the receiver with type tk+12 (d
′, t2) ∈ T k+12 who receives message m
believes that the state is νd′(σ
∗
2(t2,m)). Thus, her best response is σ
∗
2(t
k+1
2 (d
′, t2),m) =
a2(νd′(σ
∗
2(t2,m))). Because ν is continuous and strictly decreasing in d by
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Lemma 6, for each θ ∈ Θ and a ∈ Ak(θ|σ∗):
d ∈ D ⇐⇒ νd(a) ∈ [νε(a), ν−ε(a)].
Also, because ν is continuous and strictly increasing in a by Lemma 6,
for each θ ∈ Θ and d ∈ D:
a ∈ Ak(θ|σ∗)⇐⇒ νd(a) ∈ [νd(αk−(θ)), νd(αk+(θ))],
where αk−(θ) = minA
k(θ|σ∗) and αk+(θ) = maxAk(θ|σ∗). Hence:
Ak+1(θ|σ∗) = [a2(νε(αk−(θ))), a2(ν−ε(αk+(θ)))]. (52)
Because a21 > 0, νε(α
k
−(θ)) < α
k
−(θ) and α
k
+(θ) < ν−ε(α
k
+(θ)), we have
Ak+1(θ|σ∗) ⊋ Ak(θ|σ∗) for any θ.
Finally, we show that A˜(θ|σ∗) = ⋃k Ak(θ|σ∗) = A for any θ ∈ Θ. Suppose
contrarily that there exists θ ∈ Θ such that A˜(θ|σ∗) ̸= A; that is, either
inf A˜(θ|σ∗) > −∞ or sup A˜(θ|σ∗) < +∞. Without loss of generality, assume
that inf A˜(θ|σ∗) = α˜−(θ) > −∞. Let A = [α˜−(θ), a2(θ)], and define a
function ∆ : A → R so that ∆(a) = ν0(a) − νε(a) for a ∈ A. Because ∆
is continuous on a compact set A and ∆(a) > 0 for all a ∈ A, there exists
a˜ ∈ A such that ∆(a) ≥ ∆(a˜) = δ˜ > 0 for all a ∈ A.
Lemma 7. For any k, νε(α
k
−(θ)) ≤ θ − (k + 1)δ˜.
Proof. We prove the statement by induction on k. For k = 0, α0−(θ) =
60
a2(θ). Hence, ∆(α0−(θ)) = ν0(α
0
−(θ)) − νε(α0−(θ)) = θ − νε(α0−(θ)) ≥ δ˜, or
νε(α
0
−) ≤ θ− δ˜. Suppose that this inequality holds up to k. For k+1, we have
∆(αk+1− (θ)) = ν0(a
2(νε(α
k
−(θ))))−νε(αk+1− (θ)) = νε(αk−(θ))−νε(αk+1− (θ)) ≥ δ˜,
and hence, νε(α
k+1
− (θ)) ≤ νε(αk−(θ)) − δ˜ ≤ θ − (k + 1)δ˜ − δ˜ = θ − (k + 2)δ˜.
Thus, we obtain νε(α
k
−(θ)) ≤ θ − (k + 1)δ˜ for all k.
Because α˜−(θ) is finite, νε(α˜−(θ)) is also finite. However, Lemma 7
says that νε(α
k
−(θ)) < νε(α˜−(θ)) holds for sufficiently large k. This implies
αk−(θ) < α˜−(θ), which contradicts α
k
−(θ) = inf A
k(θ) ≥ inf A˜(θ|σ∗) = α˜−(θ).
Therefore, inf A˜(θ|σ∗) = −∞ for any θ ∈ Θ, and likewise, sup A˜(θ|σ∗) = +∞
for any θ ∈ Θ. We thus conclude that A˜(θ|σ∗) = A for any θ ∈ Θ, which
implies that A(θ|σ∗) = A for any θ ∈ Θ because A˜(θ|σ∗) ⊆ A(θ|σ∗). □
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